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Ingrid Amalfis Santos-Reyes asks us to review the
Board of Immigration Appeals’ decision to affirm the
immigration judge’s pretermition of her application for
cancellation of removal. Santos-Reyes maintains that the
BIA erred by misinterpreting the stop-time rule (8 U.S.C. §
1229b(d)(1)) resulting in a miscalculation of her years of
continuous residence. We will deny the petition.
I.
The United States admitted Santos-Reyes, a citizen of
the Dominican Republic, on October 3, 1991 as a conditional
permanent resident. Upon her return to the United States
from a trip in 2007, the Department of Homeland Security
charged her with inadmissibility as an alien convicted of a
crime of moral turpitude (8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I)),
arising from her June 9, 1999 conviction for receiving stolen
property, criminal conspiracy, and criminal solicitation.
Santos-Reyes, relying upon 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a),
sought cancellation of removal based upon seven years of
continuous residence. That provision states as follows:
The Attorney General may cancel
removal in the case of an alien
who is inadmissible or deportable
from the United States if the
alien-- . . . (2) has resided in the
United States continuously for 7
years after having been admitted
in any status . . . .
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8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a). The government challenged SantosReyes’ application, asserting that the criminal conspiracy in
which she participated began on August 18, 1998 and
continued to October 27, 1998, triggering the “stop-time rule”
and disqualifying her from the relief she sought. That rule
says the following:
For purposes of this section, any
period of continuous residence or
continuous physical presence in
the United States shall be deemed
to end . . . (B) when the alien has
committed an offense referred to
in section 1182(a)(2) of this title
that renders the alien inadmissible
to the United States under section
1182(a)(2) of this title or
removable from the United States
under section 1227(a)(2) or
1227(a)(4) of this title, whichever
is earliest.
8 U.S.C. § 1229b(d)(1). The BIA upheld the immigration
judge’s decision to apply the stop-time rule and pretermit
Santos-Reyes’ request for cancellation of removal, ruling that
a conviction record showing August 18, 1998 as the incident
date established that her criminal conduct occurred before
seven years of continuous residency had elapsed.
II.
Santos-Reyes appeals the BIA’s decision, arguing that
a lack of specificity about the date of her involvement in the
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conspiracy, and ambiguity in the statutory language
concerning the trigger date for the stop-time rule resulted in
error by the BIA.
According to Santos-Reyes, the
Government’s case is grounded in the Commonwealth of
Pennsylvania’s vague criminal complaint. The complaint
refers only to “Jane Doe Number One” and provides only a
range of dates that encompass all conduct by all conspirators,
rather than dates relating specifically to Santos-Reyes.
Relying upon this record, she claims that the BIA erred by
ruling that she committed the offense on August 18, 1998, the
date the general conspiracy began.
Moreover, Santos-Reyes maintains that Congress’
construction of the stop-time rule in the present-perfect tense
makes the referent date for invoking the rule subject to
interpretation.
Her focus is upon the following line:
“[C]ontinuous physical presence in the United States shall be
deemed to end . . . when the alien has committed an offense.”
Id. (emphasis added). In light of the supposed ambiguity in
the stop-time rule, she proposes that the immigration judge
and the BIA should have calculated her continuous residence
period using her arrest date, October 31, 1998, because it is
the only date certain in the record. Her seven years of
continuous residence would have elapsed by this date.
We have jurisdiction under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D).
We review the BIA’s legal determinations de novo, “subject
to the principles of deference articulated in Chevron . . . . ”
Kaplun v. Attorney General of the United States, 602 F.3d
260, 265 (3d Cir. 2010) (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44
(1984)). Where, as here, the BIA relies upon the reasoning of
the immigration judge, we review both the decision of the
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BIA and the immigration judge. Sandie v. Attorney General,
562 F.3d 246, 250 (3d Cir. 2009). We take up the statutory
interpretation issue first.
III.
The present-perfect tense refers to an action that “is
now completed, or continues up to the present.” Chicago
Manual of Style, 16th ed. (2010), p. 236. Although it is
conceivable that the perfect tense might open some statutory
provisions to different interpretations in certain
circumstances, it does not impact the instant case.
“Commit” means “[t]o perpetrate or perform.” Oxford
English Dictionary, Online Edition, June 2011,
http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/37160#eid8745869,
last
visited October 12, 2011. There is no support for SantosReyes’ assertion that Congress’ use of the word “commit” in
the present-perfect tense (“has committed”) transforms a
word that is generally focused upon the subject’s conduct into
one that refers to the moment when the subject is criminally
charged for the conduct.
Moreover, mindful that the United States charged
Santos-Reyes with inadmissibility, it is instructive that
Congress described the grounds for inadmissibility as
follows:
Except as provided in clause (ii),
any alien convicted of, or who
admits having committed, or who
admits committing acts which
constitute the essential elements
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of - - (I) a crime involving moral
turpitude . . . or conspiracy to
commit such a crime, or (II) a
violation . . . relating to a
controlled substance. . . is
inadmissible.
8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2)(A)(i) (emphasis added). With respect
to the word “committed,” the unmistakable focus here is upon
the alien’s acts that constitute the crime, rather than the
subsequent arrest.
As the Supreme Court said: “[a]mbiguity is a creature
not of definitional possibilities but of statutory context . . . .”
Brown v. Gardner, 513 U.S. 115, 118 (1994); See also Alli v.
Decker, 650 F.3d 1007 (3d Cir. 2011). Here, Congress’
choice of verb tense did not dilute the clarity of its intent. All
points of reference lead to the conclusion that the phrase “has
committed” in section 1229b(d)(1) means the stop-time rule
is triggered either by an alien’s criminal conduct occurring on
a particular date before the end of the seventh year of
continuous residence, or conduct that runs up to the date
when the seventh year of residency ends. Therefore, we
reject Santos-Reyes’ assertion that the BIA erred by refusing
to use her arrest date to determine the residency terminal
date.1

1

Moreover, even were we to find that an ambiguity exists by
virtue of the use of the present-perfect tense, the BIA’s
interpretation of the stop-time rule in this case is consistent
with proper grammar and with other provisions of the statute.
We, therefore, conclude that it is eminently reasonable for the
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Having so ruled, we do not have jurisdiction to review
the remaining issues of Santos-Reyes’ petition. She claims
that her arrest date must be used to determine the applicability
of the stop-time rule because the record did not establish a
date certain when she committed the crime. Yet, the BIA
concluded that, with respect to Santos-Reyes involvement in
the conspiracy, “[t]he record sufficiently establishes that
August 18, 1998, was the commission date.” We do not have
jurisdiction to ascertain whether this factual finding was
supported by substantial evidence. 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C).
2

For all of these reasons, we will deny the petition for
review.

BIA to interpret the stop-time rule as tied to the date of the
alien’s criminal conduct.
2

Santos-Reyes’s brief could be read as asserting that the
Government never pleaded, and the BIA never determined, a
date certain for the commencement of her criminal conduct,
relying instead upon the general range of dates set out in the
Commonwealth of Pennsylvania’s criminal complaint that
applied to all of the co-conspirators.
However, the
Government pleaded, and the BIA determined, that the date
for the offending conduct was August 18, 1998. Accordingly,
we conclude that this is a purely factual matter, beyond our
appellate jurisdiction.
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